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Courts in Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes:
The Judicialization of Turkish (and Iranian) Politics
Hootan Shambayati
Turkey is not a typical authoritarian or democratic regime. For much of the
past six decades Turkey has held regular multiparty and reasonably free and
fair elections. Power has changed hands numerous times, and governments
have come to office and left as a result of elections. Furthermore, even though
the Turkish military has intervened in the political process on a number of
occasions, unlike in most other developing countries, the periods of direct
military rule have been relatively short (1960–1962 and 1980–1983). Finally,
for much of the past half-century, Turkey has had lively social and political
societies that have acted with relative freedom, although major shortcomings
continue to plague both. There is much to suggest that Turkey should be
classified as a democracy.
At the same time, however, it is widely recognized that the Turkish political
system displays authoritarian tendencies and that the military continues to
play an important role in Turkish politics. The Turkish military has formally
intervened in politics on four occasions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997). In 1960
and 1980, the military officially assumed the reins of power, while in the other
two instances it limited itself to issuing a series of ultimatums that eventually
brought down the governments of the day without formally interrupting the
democratic experience.
The 1960 and 1980 military coups were followed by attempts to restructure
political and social life through new constitutions. The military’s desire to
redesign the political and social life of the polity is, of course, a common
feature of many military interventions. Military interventions are frequently
reactions to what officers believe to be the shortcomings of the political system
and are often followed by attempts to fundamentally alter the basis of the
political system. In the Turkish case, the short periods of military rule have
meant that the military has had to limit itself to altering the formal rules of the
game while leaving the implementation of more deep-rooted changes until
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after the return to civilian rule. Consequently, creating a constitutional setup
that allowed it to continue to influence civilian politicians and intervene in
the political process was one of the major goals of the military leadership in
both the 1960 and the 1980 military coups.
On each occasion the military regime imposed a new constitution on the
nation before formally returning power to civilian politicians. Despite some
major differences in the area of rights and liberties, the military-inspired 1961
and 1982 constitutions both display the fundamental distrust of the state elite
toward politics and politicians (Özbudun 2000: 53–60). As I discuss below,
both constitutions recognized the legitimacy of elections and elected officials,
but at the same time tried to limit the effectiveness of elected institutions by
subjecting them to control by a network of unelected institutions. In the view
of military officers and high-ranking bureaucrats, including many jurists, self-
interested politicians could not be trusted with serving the national interest.
Accordingly, both constitutions were designed to limit the powers of the par-
liament and elected institutions by subjecting them to control by unelected
state institutions.
In their attempts to restrict the powers of the parliament, both constitutions
not only provided the military with formally recognized mechanisms to inter-
vene in day-to-day policymaking but also empowered the judiciary to review
the decisions of the parliament and the elected governments. As I discuss
below, this division of sovereignty between elected and unelected institutions
has contributed to the judicialization of Turkish politics and has led to the
emergence of Turkish courts, particularly the Constitutional Court and the
Council of State, as important political institutions that have often used their
powers to counteract the parliament.
The division of sovereignty between elected and unelected institutions, of
course, is not unique to Turkey and can be found in many regimes. Nor is it the
function of a particular ideology. The prototype of such regimes is the Islamic
Republic of Iran where the powers of the elected parliament and the presi-
dent are subject to review by a web of institutions controlled by a religiously
empowered Supreme Leader. As I discuss at the end of this chapter, in Iran
too this political structure has contributed to the judicialization of politics.
Since the bulk of this chapter deals with the Turkish case, I begin with a
brief discussion of the main characteristics of military-inspired judicial empow-
erments. I will argue that military regimes might be particularly interested
in empowering the courts to become active in the political arena after the
military’s return to the barracks. I will then proceed to discuss the specifics of
the Turkish political system and the role of the judiciary in Turkish politics.
The final section of the chapter briefly discusses the Iranian case.
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military-inspired judicial empowerment
Both Bruce Ackerman and Tom Ginsburg have argued that judicial review is
associated with weak militaries (Ackerman 1997; Ginsburg 2003: 83). A similar
conclusion can be reached based on Ran Hirschl’s “hegemonic preservation
thesis.” According to Hirschl, waning political actors will choose to empower
the courts to maintain hegemony in the event they lose control of the Parlia-
ment (Hirschl 2004). While a strong military, or for that matter any other strong
actor, need not rely on the courts to protect its interest while in power, a mil-
itary regime might have strong incentives to empower the courts before leav-
ing office. Furthermore, political systems based on competitive elections with
unelected “guardians,” such as those found in Turkey and Iran, require a net-
work of institutions that often include the courts to control elected institutions
without undermining the stature of the guardians as allegedly above politics.
The military does not face the same dilemmas faced by civilian political
institutions when empowering the courts. When civilian executives and legis-
lators create constitutional tribunals, they are creating organizations that limit
their own powers. When the military empowers the judiciary it creates an
institution that limits the powers of civilian institutions without necessarily
affecting the position of the armed forces. First, the military’s core internal
concerns, such as training or promotion, are likely to be outside the compe-
tence of the civilian judicial institutions, including constitutional tribunals. In
the Turkish case, for example, the 1982 Constitution forbids the civilian courts
from reviewing decisions of the Supreme Military Council.1
Second, the military is not equally interested in all policy areas. The military
is likely to be much more interested in security and order than in public health
or price controls, for example. Not only have the courts generally accommo-
dated security needs but also an outgoing military regime can put in place rules
and regulations that are exempt from review by judicial authorities. Until its
amendment in 2001, for example, the 1982 Turkish Constitution prevented
the courts from reviewing the constitutionality of laws and regulations put in
place by the military regime.
Third, particularly in civil law countries, the military might see the judiciary
as a natural ally in the post-transition period. Like the military, the judiciary in
the civil law tradition is a hierarchical organization performing a “technical”
role. Judges enter the judicial service shortly after completing their legal
education and spend their entire careers within the judiciary. Like military
officers, judges see their role as technical and believe that they are merely
1 Article 125.
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applying the law. Judges are trained to view law and politics as two completely
distinct arenas. Furthermore, as in the military, the promotion of judicial
personnel in the civil law tradition has historically been controlled by the
more senior judges, producing an ideologically homogeneous institution with
a strong esprit de corps that identifies strongly with the state and sees politics
and politicians as divisive and corrupt. In short, the military and the judiciary
might share a number of common values and assumptions about politics
and politicians (Correa Sutil 1993; Galleguillos 1998; Guarnieri and Pederzoli
2002: 49; Hilbink 1999, 2001; Tate 1993).
Finally, an outgoing military regime can create constitutional tribunals and
other judicial institutions that will be inclined to give the military’s point
of view the most favorable of hearings. Self-interested political actors adopt
judicial review as an “insurance policy” to protect their interest in the event
of future electoral losses (Ginsburg 2003: 25). The institutional design of the
judiciary and the high courts, like those of other institutions in a democ-
racy, depends on the relative strength and the interest of the political actors
(Ginsburg 2003; Magalhaes 1999: 43; Smithey and Ishiyama 2000, 2002). Their
ideal institutional design will produce judicial actors who will be partial to their
interest whether they are in or out of power.
Two aspects of judicial institutions are of particular interest to political
actors. First, judicial appointment procedures affect the ability of dominant
political actors to appoint like-minded judges or to prevent the appointment of
judges whose preferences they do not like. Second, the rules governing judicial
careers and the institutions that manage those careers determine the judiciary’s
responsiveness to political actors. As Magalhaes, Guarnieri,and Kaminis (2007)
conclude, “The control of a system of punishments and rewards associated to
judicial careers (promotion, assignment, recall) . . . can be used to condition
judicial behavior, independently of the actual composition of courts and the
policy preferences of judges.”
Civilian political actors’ preferred institutional design depends on their
estimate of their own political prospects under the democratic regime (Mag-
alhaes 1999; Smithey and Ishiyama 2000). In East European countries where
the outgoing Communist parties expected to hold onto power by winning
the upcoming free elections, they were willing to increase the oversight pow-
ers of the political branches over the judiciary. Where they expected to lose
the elections, however, they tended to isolate the judiciary from the political
branches. Where the incumbent rulers were uncertain of their prospects under
the democratic regime, they were more likely to provide a role for the oppo-
sition in appointing judges and less likely to introduce sweeping institutional
changes (Magalhaes 1999: 47–48).
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Transitions from military rule follow a similar logic. However, in these cases
the picture is more complex. As a unit of the state, the military will be rein-
corporated into the state apparatus after the transition and can be certain of its
continued participation in the state under the democratic regime. However,
the military, unlike civilian authoritarian institutions such as Communist par-
ties, cannot reorganize itself to compete in democratic elections. An outgoing
military regime is an actor with no expectation of winning elected office, but
certain of the military’s continued influence under the new regime. As the
Turkish case demonstrates, in such cases the tendency will be toward the
creation of politically powerful judicial institutions to act as guardians of the
military-sponsored constitutional order without directly involving the military.
At the same time, however, the outgoing military regime will try to minimize
the influence of the political branches in the affairs of the judiciary, including
appointments to the high courts.
the turkish political system
In 1998, when veteran politician and many times prime minister Süleyman
Demirel occupied the presidential office, he was asked to comment on a
growing crisis between the then-prime minister Mesut Yilmaz and the military
leadership. According to published reports Demirel replied with the following
story:
In an English zoo there was an experiment to have wolves and sheep live
together in one cage. Someone asked the director if the experiment was
working. The director replied, yes, but occasionally we have to replace the
sheep (Bila 1998).
Mr. Demirel should know. As prime minister he had been removed from of-
fice by the military in 1971 and 1980; as president he had presided over the
military-engineered downfall of the Islamist Welfare party government in June
1997 and the party’s eventual closure by the Constitutional Court in January
1998.
As the story above suggests, Turkey is an example of what Daniel Brumberg
has called “dissonant institutionalization.” According to Brumberg “dissonant
institutionalization occurs when competing images of political community
and the symbolic systems legitimating them are reproduced in the formal
and informal institutions of state and society” (Brumberg 2001: 33–34). As
a consequence, systems based on dissonant institutionalization are likely to
produce high levels of political tension.
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In the Turkish case, dissonant institutionalization has led to a bifurcated
political system, where parts of the system aim at transforming the society,
while others try to maintain the status quo. The consequence has been a
high level of tension between what the Turks refer to as the State (devlet),
consisting of the security establishment, the presidency, the judiciary, and
parts of the civilian bureaucracy, and the government (hükümet), consisting of
the elected Parliament and cabinet. The management of the resultant tensions
is a fundamental concern of the political system.
At the same time, however, the system’s continued survival depends on
maintaining a high level of tensions between the competing institutions.
While the continued coexistence of the wolves and the sheep in the same
cage requires mechanisms to keep the two separate from each other, it also
needs constant justification. As I have discussed elsewhere, “a regime based
on divided sovereignty must prevent social and political tensions from boiling
over and threatening the stability of the system, while at the same time gener-
ating enough tensions to justify the continued presence of both heads of the
executive” (Shambayati 2004).
Regimes such as that found in Turkey are particularly vulnerable to societal
challenges. Dissonant institutionalization is an indication that the ideological
basis of the regime is weak (Brumberg 2001). In the Turkish case, the state is
officially based on Kemalism. Kemalism, however, has never evolved into a
full-fledged coherent ideology.
Kemalism aims at transforming society, particularly in areas such as sec-
ularism and nationalism, or, in the words of Ataturk, to bring the people to
“the level of contemporary civilization.”2 The Turkish state elites see the state
and the law as mechanisms for the transformation of society and often find
themselves at odds with powerful societal actors whose interests are threat-
ened by the civilizing mission. Furthermore, as the emergence of a modernist
Islamist movement and Kurdish nationalism suggests, state policies have had
unintended consequences and have led to the emergence of new social and
political movements that are not easily incorporated into the existing political
structure. From the perspective of the state elite, including many judges, the
proper function of the courts is to defend the civilizing mission against poten-
tial threats from society, even if at times that means acting against the will of
the nation as expressed through elections.
Dissonant institutionalization also contributes to judicialization at another
level. As the story of the wolves and the lambs demonstrates, the division of
2 This oft-repeated phrase is from a speech delivered by Ataturk on the Occasion of the
Tenth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Turkish Republic (29 October 1933). See
http://www.allaboutturkey.com/ata_speech.htm
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sovereignty between elected and unelected executives is public and formally
sanctioned. Both the Constitutions of 1961 and 1982 and other laws provided
for a military-dominated National Security Council as an important part of
the decision-making process and gave the military considerable power in the
formulation and implementation of policies through a variety of nonpolitical
regulatory and supervisory boards, such as the Higher Education Board and
the Board of Radio and Television. The Turkish military is not merely the
“guardian of the system,” but is an active participant in the political decision-
making process.
Nor is the military shy about its political role. In fact, suggestions that the
military might not be interested in a given political issue are often met with a
statement from the high command denying the lack of interest. For example, a
few months prior to the selection of a new president by the Parliament in 2000,
the chief of the general staff declared that it was “inconceivable that the military
would not have an opinion on who will be the next president” (Hürriyet, 15
April 2000). Similarly, in 2003 when a meeting between the Commander of
the Land Forces and a group of university rectors who opposed a government
proposal to reform the Higher Education Board and the university entrance
requirements caused a public controversy, the general staff circulated a formal
statement that read “it is natural that developments pertaining to the national
education system, which is of vital importance for Turkey, are followed by the
General Staff” (Turkish Daily News, September 16, 2003)
Furthermore, the military’s role is accepted as legitimate by a large segment
of the political leadership and the public in general. For example, the military
statements quoted above were immediately justified by the political leadership
as “natural.” In the first instance, as the then-prime minister Bülent Ecevit put
it, “it is only natural that the military will be interested in these elections
especially when the president is also the commander in chief of the armed
forces and the head of the National Security Council” (Turkish Daily News,
16 April 2000). Similarly, the main opposition party (the Republican People’s
Party) characterized the rectors’ meeting with the generals “as very normal”
(Turkish Daily News, 16 September 2003)
Despite its influence, the fact that the military has to share power with
popularly elected politicians means that it can only be effective if it can main-
tain its above-politics stature in public’s mind. The framers of the Turkish
constitutions tried to achieve this objective by transferring potentially con-
tentious policy debates away from the Parliament and entrusting them to the
so-called neutral institutions such as courts. As Haggard and Kaufman have
argued, regimes with guardians create “insulated decision-making structures
that can be counted on to pursue [the guardian’s] policy agenda” (Haggard
and Kaufman 1995: 121).
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Judicial Empowerment in Turkey
The empowerment of the judiciary in Turkey dates back to the military-
inspired Constitution of 1961, when “the judiciary was given a considerable
share in the exercise of sovereignty” (Aybay 1977: 24). This so-called liberal
constitution was a reaction to what many believed to have been serious abuses
of political power by the elected Democratic Party governments (1950–1960)
that had necessitated the 1960 military intervention. Like their counterparts in
some other developing countries, the Turkish military turned to the legal com-
munity to legitimate the military intervention. As Rona Aybay notes, “one of
the most interesting aspect of the May 27 [1960] coup is its legalistic tendency”
(Aybay 1977: 21). Within hours after the coup the junta asked for and received
the endorsement of a group of law professors who issued a rather lengthy
statement in support of the coup. The statement in part read as follows:
It is not right to regard the situation in which we find ourselves today as an
ordinary political coup d’Ètat. The political power which should represent
the conception of State, law, justice, morality, public interest and public
service and should protect public interests had for months, even years, lost
this character, and had become a material force representing personal power
and ambition and class interests.
The power of the State, which before all else should be a social power
bound by law, was transformed into an instrument of this ambition and
power. For this reason this political power lost all its moral ties with its
army . . . with its courts and the bar, with its officials who wanted to be loyal
to their duties, with its universities, and with its press which represents public
opinion, and with all its other social institutions and forces, and fell into a
position hostile to the State’s genuine and main institutions, and to Ataturk’s
reforms, which are of extraordinary value and importance if Turkey is to
occupy a worthy place among the nations of the world as a civilized State
(cited in Ahmad 1977: 162–163).
The experiences of the 1950s and the coup had convinced the military
leadership and their civilian allies that the new constitutional structure should
impose limits on the powers of the Parliament and prevent any single party from
dominating the government. To meet this requirement, the 1961 Constitution
adopted a new concept of sovereignty. Article 4 of the Constitution declared,
Sovereignty is vested in the nation without reservation and condition. The
nation shall exercise its sovereignty through the authorized agencies as pre-
scribed by the principles laid down in the Constitution.
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These words were repeated in article 6 of the 1982 Constitution and, as the
official history of the Constitutional Court interprets them, were meant, “to
put an end to the principle of the supremacy of the parliament.”3
The 1961 Constitution took two steps to operationalize this provision. First,
it increased the internal autonomy of some institutions such as universities
and the radio and television authority and imposed severe limits on the abil-
ity of the Parliament to interfere in their internal affairs. Similarly, in an
attempt to increase the independence of the judiciary, the newly established
Supreme Council of Judges was given the responsibility to administer all judi-
cial personnel matters (Devereux 1965). Furthermore, to further protect the
autonomy of the universities and the judiciary, the constitution authorized the
two institutions to petition the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC), another
new institution, in matters relating to their own functions.
Second, the 1961 Constitution divided sovereignty among a number of newly
created institutions. Chief among these was the newly established National
Security Council, which for the first time provided a formal venue for military
participation in political decisions. In the judicial arena, the constitution
enhanced the powers of the Council of State, an administrative court dating
back to the Ottoman era and modeled after the French conseil d’etat, and
created a Constitutional Court.
The establishment of the Constitutional Court was achieved with little
controversy. The idea for a constitutional court with the power to review the
constitutionality of legislative acts was first proposed in the mid-1950s by the
Republican People’s Party (RPP; McCally 1956), which as the main opposition
party suffered the most under Democratic Party rule, and had little difficulty
in passing through the RPP-dominated constituent assembly (Kili 1971: 139).
Modeled after continental European constitutional courts, the Constitutional
Court “was expected to counterbalance political institutions, especially the
parliament, which would abuse their powers.”4
The 1961 Constitution was “a last-ditch effort by the bureaucratic intelli-
gentsia to set the substantive, as well as the procedural, rules of the political
game in Turkey” (Heper 1985: 89). It tried to enhance the autonomy of the state
by protecting it against interest-based politics. Although it granted the right of
political participation, it also created bureaucratically staffed agencies to act
as watchdogs over political institutions. Accordingly, in their structures and
powers the TCC and other judicial organs reflected a constitutional design
3 These words had originally appeared in a 1977 article by Rona Aybay (Aybay 1977: 23) and were
repeated without attribution on the TCC’s Web site.
4 Official Web page.
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that assumed a fundamental “mistrust of the organs dependent upon universal
suffrage” (Aybay 1977: 24).
The consequence has been that the Turkish courts have not shied away
from challenging the Parliament and elected officials. Between 1962 and 1980
the TCC reviewed 350 petitions for abstract review and annulled 37 percent
of them (Shambayati 2008). In its attempts to the “tame the Parliament” the
TCC was joined by the Council of State, which annulled 1,400 governmental
decrees between 1965 and 1971 (Heper 1985: 92). The hyperactivity of the courts
in the pre-1980 period led to charges that the courts were making it impossible
for the governments of the day to govern and undoubtedly contributed to the
political tensions and instability that finally resulted in the September 12, 1982,
military takeover (Ahmad 1977; Dodd 1983).
Once again the period of direct military takeover was short, and power was
returned to elected civilian officials within three years. Again, the military
tried to restructure political and social life by introducing a new constitution.
In the rising political polarization of the 1960s and the 1970s the internal
autonomy of the universities and other institutions proved destabilizing, and
the 1982 Constitution reversed the trend. This, however, did not result in
an increase in the powers of the Parliament. Instead the 1982 Constitution
relied on a number of so-called “neutral” institutions and commissions such
as the Higher Education Board to administer the previously autonomous
institutions.5 A common feature of these institutions is that until the recent
EU-inspired reforms they included a military representative on their boards.
The 1982 Constitution not only maintained the division of sovereignty intro-
duced in 1961, but further limited the powers of the Parliament by stripping
it of its appointment powers and transferring them to the president, an indi-
rectly elected nonpartisan figure. This enhancement of presidential powers
was designed to increase the military’s influence. Under the new constitution,
the leader of the military junta, General Evren, automatically assumed the
presidency upon its formal adoption.6 Furthermore, the framers hoped that
the pre-coup practice of the Parliament choosing a retired military officer
for the presidency would continue. Although of the four men who have occu-
pied the office since 1983, Evren is the only one with a military background,
the presidency, particularly under its current occupant Ahmet Necdet Sezer,
a former president of the TCC, continues to be identified with the state and
5 This controversial body is charged with supervising universities and was first introduced in
the 1970s, but was ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court because it violated
the constitutionally guaranteed principle of the autonomy of the universities. It was given
constitutional status in the 1982 Constitution.
6 Provisional Article 1.
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acts as a brake on the powers of the Parliament. As the next section shows,
the changes in the powers of the president were also designed to reduce the
influence of the Parliament over the judiciary.
The Judiciary After 1982
The 1982 Constitution maintained the basic division of sovereignty introduced
by its predecessor and further enhanced the role of nonelected institutions in
the decision-making process. The earlier constitution had relied on a num-
ber of institutions in which members appointed by the Parliament and those
appointed by the various state agencies jointly exercised power. This coopera-
tive structure, however, proved unsatisfactory as political tensions and violence
continued to increase in the 1960s and the 1970s. Therefore, the 1982 Constitu-
tion abandoned the cooperative framework in support of a new structure that
sharply reduced the role of the Parliament in determining the membership of
the so-called neutral institutions and boards while increasing the role of state
institutions. The most dramatic example was the National Security Council
whose powers were greatly enhanced and in which the number of military
members was increased at the expense of the civilian wing.7
A similar design was introduced for judicial institutions. Table 11.1 shows
the appointment procedures for various judicial institutions. Under the 1961
Constitution the two houses of parliament appointed one-third of the members
of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors and one-third of the
justices of the Constitutional Court. The 1982 Constitution, however, under
the guise of protecting the independence of the courts completely eliminated
the role of the Parliament as either a nominating or an appointing body.8
Similarly, the 1982 Constitution reduced the number of judges on the Con-
stitutional Court and drastically altered the appointment procedure. Under
the original design, the Parliament appointed five of the justices while the
other high courts and the president appointed the other ten permanent jus-
tices. Under the system in place since 1982, the Parliament and the cabinet
have no role in the appointment process. Instead, the courts are the nominat-
ing bodies in the current system, while the president appoints all justices. For
each seat the appropriate court submits a list of three candidates drawn from
among its own justices and prosecutors to the president, who makes the final
7 A series of constitutional amendments adopted since 2001 have increased the number of civilian
members of the NSC in an attempt to “civilianize” the organization.
8 The Minister of Justice and his deputy take part in the meetings of the council in an ex officio
capacity.
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table 11.1 Judicial appointment procedures
Institution 1961 Constitution 1982 Constitution
Constitutional Court Permanent 15 Permanent 11
Substitute (5) Substitute (4)
Court of Cassation 4 (2) 2 (2) nomination
Council of State 3 (1) 2 (1) nomination
Court of Accounts 1 1 nomination
Military Court Cassation 1 nomination
Military Admin. Court 1 nomination
Higher Ed Council 1 nomination
Nat’l Assembly 3∗ (1) 0
Senate 2∗ (1) NA
President 2∗∗ 11 (4)
Supreme Council of Permanent 18 Permanent 6
Judges Substitute (5) (Substitute 5)
Court of Cassation 6 (2) 3 (3) nomination
Judges of 1st rank 6 (1)
Nat’l Assembly 3 (1)
Senate 3 (1)
Council of State 0 3 (2) nomination
President 0 6 (5)
Council of State
Constitutional Court All members 0






∗ One has to be a member of the teaching staff of the departments of law, economics, or political
science.
∗∗ One had to be a member of the Military Court of Cassation.
Figures in italics are nominations.
appointment. Finally, under the 1982 Constitution the military courts nomi-
nate two of the permanent justices of the TCC, a provision that is reminiscent
of the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal in which the national security council
appoints two of the justices.
The military was also given a role in the administration of justice through
the controversial State Security Courts. The establishment of these courts had
been a long-term military objective dating back to the coup by the memo-
randum of March 12, 1971 (Hale 1977: 187). They were established in 1973
through a constitutional amendment and special legislation to deal with the
increasing political violence coming from both the right and the left of the
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political spectrum. In 1975, the Constitutional Court, acting on a petition from
the Diyarbakir State Security Court, ruled that the tribunals were unconstitu-
tional and ordered their closure.9 The abolishment of these courts was given
as a reason by the leaders of the 1980 coup as to why the 1961 Constitution was
inadequate.
The framers of the 1982 Constitution revived the State Security Courts to
deal with a wide range of crimes. Unlike ordinary courts, these courts were
presided over by a panel of three judges, one of whom was a military judge
appointed by the military courts. The Supreme Council of Judges and Public
Prosecutors appointed the civilian judges and prosecutors. Until their final
abolition in 2004 under pressure from the European Union and human rights
organizations, these courts were one of the mainstays of the Turkish judicial
system and used special procedures to try a wide range of crimes ranging
from reciting politically provocative poetry10 to acts of terrorism. Both their
composition and their procedures were found to be in violation of numerous
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and led to many
rulings against Turkey by the European Court of Human Rights. At the same
time, however, in the words of one prosecutor, they also “prevented many
military coups” by satisfying the military’s demands for harsh punishments for
those accused of violating state security laws (Turkish Daily News February
20, 2001). Other judicial institutions have also contributed to fulfilling this
function of the courts. As I discuss in the next section, the Constitutional Court
and the Council of State have been particularly important in preventing direct
military interventions. Through their rulings and public pronouncements both
institutions have become important actors in the political arena.
The Courts in Action
The high wall between the judiciary and elected institutions erected by the
1982 Constitution and the judiciary’s belief that it has a share in the exercise
of sovereignty have turned Turkey into one of the most judicialized polities to
be found in the modern world. On average the Constitutional Court issues a
judgment for annulment in 76 percent of the cases that it receives for abstract
review. As in other countries with abstract review procedures, most petitions for
review are made by the opposition party, although Turkey’s current president
9 Although the original petition was partially based on the principle of the unconstitutionality
of extraordinary tribunals, the TCC based its decision on procedural grounds.
10 This was the charge against Turkey’s current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who
served four months in jail after being convicted by the Diyarbakir State Security Court in 1999
(see Shambayati 2004).
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Ahmet Necdet Sezer, himself a former president of the Constitutional Court,
has also been very active in sending legislative acts to the TCC for review
(Hazama 1996; Shambayati 2007).
The high success rate of the abstract review petitions is no doubt in part
due to the fact that many provisions of the 1982 Constitution are no longer
applicable to today’s Turkey. Furthermore, both the process of integration
with the EU and the privatization of the economy have required economic
and political reforms that were not foreseen by the framers of the constitution.
“Radical reforms,” as Stone Sweet notes, “strain or tear the web of existing
legal regimes, administrative practices, and case law” (Stone Sweet 2000: 52).
Radical reforms, by definition, create tensions in the society and encourage
an appeal to the courts. The law and the judiciary, however, are reactionary
institutions that do not welcome reforms easily (di Federico and Guarnieri
1988: 168; Stone Sweet 1992: 39).
At the same time, however, the frequent rulings against the Parliament also
point to a fundamental distrust between elected and unelected institutions
inherent in the Turkish system. The distrust between the judiciary and politi-
cians is evident not only in the frequent rulings of the Constitutional Court
against the Parliament but also in its frequent public warnings to the ruling
governments of the day not to violate the basic principles of Kemalism, particu-
larly when it comes to secularism and national unity. Since the election of the
Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, for example, high-level
justices have repeatedly warned the government not to try to lift the ban on
the wearing of headscarves in the universities, an issue that is very important to
the party’s supporters. The strongest warning came from the president of the
TCC in 2005, who used the anniversary of the Court’s founding to warn the
government that changing the law would be unconstitutional and that even
a constitutional amendment would not suffice. He went on to remind the
government that the Court has closed other political parties for violating the
principles of secularism11 (Hürriyet April 24, 2005). In effect, the president of
the TCC was reminding the government that in a “militant democracy” like
Turkey, the courts sometimes go beyond the text of the constitution to protect
the regime.
An important aspect of protecting the Turkish democracy has been the
frequent closure of political parties (Arslan 2002; Koçak and Örücü 2003;
Kogacioglu 2003, 2004). Since 1983, the TCC has closed eighteen political
11 This, of course, was a reference to the fate of the Justice and Development Party’s predecessor,
the Welfare Party, which was forced from office by the military in June 1997 and closed by the
Court in January 1998.
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parties. The Court has been particularly tough on Islamist and pro-Kurdish
parties and has accused them of undermining secularism and the unity of the
country. In closing these parties, as Dicle Kogacioglu has argued, the court
has been participating “in shaping the boundaries as well as the content of the
political process” (Kogacioglu 2004: 459).
The Constitutional Court is not alone in this task. Other courts, too, often
use their powers to shape the content of politics. An example is a controversial
ruling by the Council of State in October 2005 that argued that a kindergarten
teacher could not be promoted because she wore a headscarf on her way to
work. Although there are no laws that ban the wearing of the Islamic headscarf
in public and the court recognized that the teacher in question had abided
by the current regulations that forbid the wearing of headscarves in schools
and government offices, it nevertheless argued that promoting her would set a
bad example for the children in her charge and could undermine the secular
basis of the state. Behind the Council’s decision was, of course, the secular
establishment’s concern that the ruling AK party was systematically promoting
its supporters into positions of influence in the state bureaucracy and was
relaxing state regulations on religious practices.
This ruling caused a mini-crisis in Turkish politics when, in May 2006, a
lawyer with ties to Islamist circles opened fire in one of the Council cham-
bers, killing one of the justices and wounding four others. The shooting was
greeted with much apprehension in Turkey, and both civilian and military
leaders rushed to support the Council of State to show their solidarity with the
judiciary. The president of the Council issued a statement that criticized the
government’s policies on secularism, blamed the attack on the government’s
criticism of the Council’s original decision, and portrayed the attack as an
attack on the secular state. The next day, large demonstrations were orga-
nized at Ataturk’s mausoleum where representatives of various segments of the
society including the political parties and the military gathered to defend the
secular basis of the state. Public statements issued by the military, the presi-
dent, and various judicial bodies emphasized the need to stay vigilant against
religious reactionaries and pointed the finger at the ruling Islamist Justice and
Development Party.
This tragic and inexcusable attack points to one of the shortcomings of
attempts to resolve political differences through court rulings. Despite numer-
ous rulings by the Council of State, the Constitutional Court, and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, all of which have upheld the provisions banning
headscarves in universities and state offices, the issue continues to play a promi-
nent role in Turkish politics. Religious and center-right parties, particularly
when in opposition, have repeatedly used the issue to rally their supporters. On
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the other hand, the secular establishment and center-left parties have continu-
ously presented these campaign promises as evidence of disregard for the rule
of law and as threats to secularism, hence justifying the continued vigilance
of the military and the judiciary in protecting the “civilizing mission” of the
state.
Similarly, the closing of numerous political parties, cultural associations,
and publications and the frequent jailing of political activists have only had lim-
ited success in eliminating social and political movements that challenge the
ideology of the state. Closed political parties, particularly those with Islamist or
pro-Kurdish social bases, quickly reorganize and appear under a new banner
to challenge the boundaries imposed by the state. The continued survival of
these movements, and in the case of Islamist and pro-Kurdish political parties
their ability to win elections, in turn is used to justify the need to vigilantly
protect the civilizing mission of the state.
Even when the courts have ruled against the state, and there are many
such instances, the rulings have tended to legitimate the continued division
of sovereignty. In the mid-1990s, for example, when a number of prominent
secular intellectuals were assassinated or attacked by terrorists with links to
fundamentalist religious circles, the Council of State ruled that the state had
failed to provide adequate protection to the individuals involved and therefore
was liable (Orucu 2000: 694). Although on the face of it these rulings were
victories against the state, they, of course, underlined the continued threat to
secularism and the inability of the elected governments to deal with it.
In short, in Turkey’s bifurcated political system the courts play an important
role in protecting the civilizing mission of the state and maintaining the
division of sovereignty between elected and unelected institutions. As the brief
discussion of the Iranian case in the next section demonstrates, this situation
is not unique to Turkey and is a function of the dissonant institutionalization
in the political system rather than any particular ideology.
courts in the islamic republic of iran
The Iranian constitution of 1979 recognizes God as the only legitimate source
of sovereignty.12 Nevertheless, the dynamics of a mass revolution and the plu-
ralism of the Shia political thought and religious establishment meant that
the framers of the constitution also had to recognize the people as a source
of sovereignty (Chehabi 2001). Accordingly, the constitution created a num-
ber of elected institutions, including a Parliament and a president. As in
12 Article 56.
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Turkey, however, the power of the elected institutions is subject to supervision
by unelected institutions. Whereas in Turkey this supervisory role is played
by the military, in Iran it is the Supreme Leader who as the highest religio-
political authority supervises all institutions of the state, including the Parlia-
ment and the presidency.13 While the Parliament and the president represent
the will of the nation as expressed through elections, the Supreme Leader
draws his legitimacy from representing the sovereignty of God based on the
doctrine of the guardianship of the jurisprudent (velayat-i faqih). The Iranian
political structure hence is based on competing notions of sovereignty and
includes institutions that are often at odds with each other (Brumberg 2001;
Buchta 2000). Consequently, high levels of tension are endemic in the Iranian
political system.
Similar to Turkey, the Iranian political system relies on a number of extrapo-
litical and semi-judicial institutions to manage the tensions created by “dis-
sonant institutionalization.” The most important actor in this regard is, of
course, the Supreme Leader himself, who is the final arbiter in all disputes.
The Supreme Leader, however, like the military in Turkey, can only play this
role if he can publicly maintain an above-politics posture. Consequently, the
Supreme Leader relies on a complex web of institutions to control elected insti-
tutions. Courts and court-like institutions are an integral part of this system and
play an important role in both managing and maintaining the tension-ridden
political structure.
Iran does not have a proper mechanism for constitutional review. The initial
attempts to establish a constitutional court based on the French Constitutional
Council were rejected in favor of a system unique to Iran. In the Iranian system
the power to review the constitutionality of legislative acts belongs to the
Council of Guardians. The Council of Guardians is simultaneously an upper
legislative house, a constitutional council controlling the constitutionality of
laws, and a religious assembly vetting un-Islamic ordinances and candidates.
As the upper house of the Parliament, the Council has to approve all pieces of
legislations before they can become law. In reviewing legislation, however, the
council does not limit itself to political considerations, but also makes a final
decision on the constitutionality of proposed acts. The constitution further
instructs the Council to also assure that all legislation meets requirements
prescribed by religious law.14 In addition to these functions, the Council also
13 Technically, the Supreme Leader is an indirectly elected official, since a popularly elected
Assembly of Experts, consisting of religiously qualified members of the clergy, selects him. He
is, however, completely unaccountable and serves for life.
14 Article 91.
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has the controversial duty to determine the qualifications of the candidates
for the various elections in the Islamic Republic, including those for the
presidency and the Parliament.
The structure of the Council and its procedures ensure that it closely follows
the ideological line established by the Supreme Leader. Six members of the
Council are religious scholars directly appointed by the Supreme Leader. The
Council also includes six nonclerical members selected by the Parliament.
However, the Parliament’s role in determining the composition of the Council
is limited by the constitutional requirement that the Head of the Judiciary,
an official appointed by the Supreme Leader, nominates the candidates. On
matters concerning constitutionality, all twelve members take part in decisions,
but the support of three-fourths of the members of the Council is required for
a ruling on the constitutionality of legislative acts. In other words, at least three
clerical members must support a decision on constitutionality. Only the six
clerical members, on the other hand, conduct reviews based on Islamic law,
and those decisions are made by a simple majority.15
Through the Council, the conservative factions within the Islamic Republic
were able to stop the reformist government of President Mohammad Khatami
from adopting many of its reform proposals. Between 1997 and 2005, the coun-
cil rejected 37 percent of the laws adopted by the Parliament and disqualified
scores of reformist candidates from standing in various elections, including
those for the Parliament and the presidency (Secor 2005: 64).
The tensions in the Iranian political system are not limited to ideological
differences between reformists and more conservative factions. They are an
integral part of the system and are caused by the structure of the Islamic
Republic. Soon after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, it became clear
that the tensions between the Parliament and the Council of Guardians, and
more generally between elected and unelected institutions, had the potential
of paralyzing the political system. This realization led to the creation of another
constitutional body, the Expediency Council.
The Supreme Leader appoints all members of the Expediency Council. In
addition to the heads of the three branches of the government (the Speaker of
the Parliament, the President, and the Head of the Judiciary), the council also
includes the six clerical members of the Council of Guardians and other per-
sonalities of the regime appointed by the Supreme Leader. As the composition
of the Expediency Council suggests, it is a forum for joint policymaking by
elected and unelected institutions. Its main function is to arbitrate differences
between the Parliament and the Council of Guardians and to establish the
15 Iranian Constitution, Articles 91–99.
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overall policies of the Islamic Republic. Its formation was a recognition of the
high levels of tension endemic in the political system.
This system is complemented by a heavy reliance on courts and the judi-
ciary. The Iranian judiciary is set up as a separate bureaucracy attached to
the office of the Supreme Leader. The head of the judicial branch is directly
appointed by the Supreme Leader and answers to him, rather than to the
elected president or the Parliament. The head of the judiciary is responsible
for the appointment of all judges and even nominates the Minister of Justice,
who is a member of the president’s cabinet. Furthermore, the Head of the
Judiciary is an active participant in the policymaking process. He not only
nominates the nonclerical members of the Guardian Council but he is also a
member of both the Expediency Council and the National Security Council.
Despite constitutional guarantees of judicial independence, the Iranian
judiciary is designed as a political institution that is responsible not only for
the administration of justice but also for the implementation of the ideologi-
cal/political line advocated by the Supreme Leader. The judiciary carries out
its multiple functions through a complex system that relies heavily on spe-
cialized courts, such as the Press Court, responsible for matters related to the
media, and the Special Court for the Clergy.
The judiciary emerged as an important political player during the pres-
idency of Khatami (1997–2005). With the unexpected election of Khatami
and the emergence of the reform movement as a viable political alterna-
tive, tensions in the Iranian political structure reached a new peak. As Eric
Rouleau notes, “The cohabitation between the faqih Ayatollah Khamenei,
the supreme politico-religious authority, and President Mohammad Khatami
[came] to resemble a multi-faceted guerrilla war” (Rouleau 1999). Having lost
at the ballot box, the conservatives, like their Turkish counterparts, relied on
the courts to contain the reform movement.
During Khatami’s tenure in office, political trials targeting his supporters
became common, and dozens of politicians, activists, journalists, and intellect-
uals were convicted of a range of political crimes. In addition, the Press Court
systematically closed many reformist newspapers (Khiabani and Sreberny
2001). Although the accused were often charged with undermining the regime,
many of them were “children of the revolution” who not only had participated
in the revolution but also had held high governmental positions in the Islamic
Republic. Furthermore, the objective of these trials was not to punish the indi-
vidual culprit, so much as to stop the political movement of the reformers.16
16 See for example the remarks of journalist Akbar Ganji, one of the leading ideologues of the
reform movement who was himself convicted for his writings, cited in Khiabani and Sreberny
(2001: 206).
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The press trials and the judicial crackdown on the reform movement closely
resemble the activities of the Turkish courts, which have often used their
powers to ban political parties and shut down civil associations and media
outlets. Fighting social movements through the courts, however, has not always
been effective. Many of the banned Turkish political parties, for examples,
have often reappeared and shown themselves capable of winning elections.
Turkey’s present ruling party, the Justice and Development Party, emerged
from the ashes of the banned Virtue Party. Virtue itself was the successor to
the banned Welfare Party (banned by the TCC in 1998) that had succeeded
the National Salvation Party (banned after the 1980 coup), which in turn was
formed after the TCC had banned the National Order Party in 1971. Similarly,
in Iran, banned newspapers often reappeared with a new title but with the same
journalists and editors (Khiabani and Sreberny 2001). As the Iranian dissident
Akbar Ganji notes, “In political crimes the court decision is not binding, if it
is not accepted as binding by the people” (Ganji 2000: 80).
conclusion
Despite their diametrically opposed ideologies, one being secular and pro-
Western and the other theocratic and anti-Western, the Republic of Turkey
and the Islamic Republic of Iran have remarkably similar political structures.
Institutionally, both regimes are a mixture of democratic and authoritarian
regime types. Whereas in Turkey, republican institutions, led by the military
and the judiciary, compete with democratically elected institutions, in Iran
it is the religious establishment and the Supreme Leader who oversee the
elected Parliament and the president. As Volpi notes, “In organizational terms
there is little that separates a body of religious overseers from a body of secular
republican overseers” (Volpi 2004: 1071). What the two countries have in com-
mon is a bifurcated political system in which unelected institutions pursuing a
civilizing mission share power with elected institutions that must be sensitive
to existing societal interests.
Both the Turkish state and its Iranian counterpart pursue civilizing missions
that aim to create new societies based on an ideology defined by the state elite.
Since the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the state has pursued
a policy aimed at creating a secular and Westernized society. Similarly, the
Islamic Revolution in Iran brought to power religious elites who rejected the
existing society in favor of a utopian Islamic society ruled as a theocracy. In
both countries, however, the state elites’ vision of the future is not shared by
important and powerful sectors. Consequently, even though the state elites
have at least partially accepted the notion of popular sovereignty based on
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814822.012
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Bilkent University Library, on 13 Dec 2018 at 15:31:11, subject to the Cambridge Core
Courts in Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes 303
universal adult suffrage, they have created an institutional setup designed
to defend the civilizing mission against its potential internal enemies. The
hard-line secularists in Turkey and their religious counterparts in Iran share a
common distrust of elected institutions that is reproduced in their respective
political structures.
Whether one sees the cohabitation of elected and unelected institutions
as the cohabitation of the “wolf and the sheep” or as “guerilla warfare,” it
is clear that in both countries the political system is tension ridden. Despite
their enormous powers neither the Turkish military nor the Iranian Supreme
Leader can guarantee the outcome of elections or the policymaking process.
To manage the resultant tensions, such political systems empower so-called
neutral institutions such as courts. The courts in these countries however, are
not “impartial actors.” Rather, their powers emanate from their partiality in
favor of the state’s civilizing mission and the continued domination of the
political system by the unelected institutions.
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